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1. The Future o f Liberalism After the End o f History
a. The breakdown of Communism - A Pyrrhus' victory?
In 1989 the victory of the liberal system seemed to be complete. The competing 
Communist system had broken down totally, an event that had often been 
predicted in the past but which seemed to be quite a surprise when it eventually 
happened - especially for those sciences focusing on the observation of politics 
and society.
Five or six years later the feeling of confidence, of being witness to a 
fresh start, opening an era of cooperation after the end of destructive conflict 
had faded away. The establishment of new liberal regimes in Middle and 
Eastern Europe has turned out to be much more complicated than presumed. 
The instability of contemporary Russia seems to be almost more of a threat than 
its compact structure as a superpower had been. The end of the clash of systems 
seems to have released new crisis potentials.
This is valid not only for the external relationships between states but for 
their internal structure as well - and not least within the victorious liberal system 
itself.
One of the explanations which have been given for this phenomenon 
recently draws on the assumption that the East-West conflict itself - or in 
economic terms: the conflict between Socialism and Capitalism - had had a 
paradigmatic structuring conflict-binding function which reinserted a potential 
for adaptability into liberal institutions forcing them to be supplemented by 
elements of the Welfare State. But this would - according to this approach - 
only be part of the phenomenon for above all this conflict is said to have had the 
function of reinforcing the vitality of Liberalism, creating a new commonly 
shared meaning within a system which is always at risk because of its always 
self-destructive tendencies eroding public commitments and social bonds.
So should we then join Benjamin Constant who - vis-à-vis the political 
upheavals caused by Napoleon - exclaimed: "Que Dieu nous rende nos Rois 
faineànts". Behind this contemporary disillusionment, of course, an old problem 
is coming to the fore, that of a lack of legitimacy of Liberalism which cannot be 
ignored for the only reason that compensatory political efforts in practice have 




























































































b. Liberalism and its dependence on conflicts
This disillusionment is also intermingled with a hidden reproach: the victory of 
the liberal system is regarded as undeserved because it is silently blamed for 
having been obtained by trickery, i.e.: by use of force borrowed from a friend- 
enemy-polarization. However, this reproach itself is the basis of a somewhat 
hypocritical "peace-initiative" taken by a left movement commending itself for 
its own, if only unvoluntary contribution to the conservation of Liberalism by 
way of intensification of conflicts. Of course, this mixture of anger and 
condescension is not a reliable basis for a detached reasonable judgement. This 
recent reinterpretation of conflicts prompted by authors of the Frankfurt School 
is not very convincing, as there are of course different types of conflicts which 
have to be distinguished, otherwise Jugoslavia would be the most stable 
political system in Europe and Switzerland would long have faded away. If we 
try to use the end of Communism as a kind of screen onto which current 
problems of liberal systems could be projected, rather an opposite idea could 
occur which could take on a heuristic function: couldn't we rather put it the 
other way round?" Are there certain similarities between liberal and Socialist 
systems coming to the fore, especially a kind of Real Socialism within 
Capitalism? Couldn't this be an approach giving access to an analysis of the 
problem of the functional State and of its relationship to society and, therewith, 
to a determination of the function of conflict for society? This does not bring us 
necessarily to conventional criticism of the Welfare State. Problems seem to be 
much more complex, we have to dig deeper. Aren't there more and more 
institutions in the public sphere - not only the State, but also the intermediary 
corporatist organizations - aren't these institutions taking up more and more 
tasks which are less and less structured, even indescribable and uncontrollable? 
Corresponding to this conjecture could be the assumption that there are political 
and social domains where we do have conflicts but rather the wrong ones? A 
structural similarity to Real Socialism could consist in the tendency of many 
public institutions to operate on the basis of purely normative self-descriptions 
which are neither adapted to control nor to learning.
c. New political risks created by Socialism within Capitalism?
Let's take an example from the educational system - though this might appear 
rather unfair - because it isn't only in this domain that the aforementioned 
problems occur. The Land Hamburg - as well as several other German Lander - 




























































































are to become more democratic. One is quite surprised because this was exactly 
the aim of education policy in the last decade, wasn't it? Schools apparently are 
to be even more democratic than they have already been since the late '60s? 
Nobody is to be excluded, it is not the children who should adapt to school, but
- as you can imagine - of course it's the other way round: the school must adapt 
to the children. The definition of learning capability and the tasks of school 
shall be worked out in cooperation with the children themselves. The old 
traditional school system took orientation from means presupposing a fixed set 
of basic qualifications on the side of the child - the new system focuses on aims
- without really telling how and by which means to attain them.
At this point, we meet an old acquaintance from Real Socialism - the 
revolutionary comparative form which is to tackle problems by way of a purely 
normative claim of outdoing the already attained progress on the highest level of 
the universally developed Socialist system.
From our preliminary observations which should bring us nearer to the 
focus of this paper one could come to the consideration that, of course, the 
tasks of schools are much more complex nowadays than they used to be in the 
past. But this is more and more regarded as a chance by people - having a 
professional or political interest at stake - to prompt purely normative 
attribution of tasks to schools and to block any kind of empirical evaluation. 
Instead eventual problems remain unstructured and are shifted openly to the 
political system. This, of course, would really make a difference to Real 
Socialism: Socialism kept problems as far as possible invisible until they took 
up such a complexity as to block any possible self-observation of the whole 
system.
A common characteristic of contemporary liberal systems and Socialism 
seems to consist in the tendency to shift problems to the State when the solution 
within decentral differentiated subsystems seems to be painful. I would like to 
conclude these introductory speculations by some generalizing remarks. To my 
mind, one of the central problems of the liberal political system seems to consist 
in the growing complexity of tasks which call into question traditional concepts 
of law as a constraint, as a limit, and that, at the same time, political institutions 
don't develop a suitable, adequately flexible self-stabilizing rule-structure which 
would have to integrate a capacity of self-observation and self-revision - 
including a set of necessary stop-rules allowing for specification of tasks and 
for a coordination with other institutions. The dissolution of stable instrumental 
means-oriented tasks - for example of schools - is regarded as equivalent to a 
freedom to normative self-description which remains protected from control and 




























































































Socialism failed - a system whose normative design was principally mirrored in 
its own self-description.
2. The Challenge of Complexity
a. From substantive to procedural rationality of law
In the following considerations I intend to focus, above all, on the necessary 
transformation of constitutional and legal systems produced by the rise of 
complexity: complexity has to be distinguished from complicatedness. The 
former notion is characterized by the limits imposed on the description of 
problems, especially because of a kind of uncertainty generated by a growing 
number of feed-backs within networks of interrelationships of a domain leading 
to unintended side-effects. To give an example: once we no longer have a clear 
model of cause-effect relationships into which a law intervenes it becomes 
possible that the application of a law changes its own factual basis and the 
expectations it presupposed.
One of my theses is that this growing problem of the dissolution of stable 
expectations, the severance of a clearly structured and differentiated hierarchy 
of presupposed "natural levels of complexity" which allowed for description 
and attribution of linear cause-effect relationships, forces the legal system to 
reintroduce more flexibility, more capacity of self-description and more learning 
capability into the range of its operations. This is equivalent to a transformation 
from substantive rationality with clear description of problems and a limited 
array of options allowing for continuous structured accumulation of experience 
to a procedural type of rationality. The latter would be characterized less by the 
growing importance of legal procedure as such than by the necessity of 
knowledge generation and the design of experimental models on the basis of 
partial, fragmentary knowledge. This is not primarily a matter of having more 
knowledge but of finding a functional equivalent to the connection between 
decision-making and experience. When I herewith stress the cognitive 
rationality of law I don't of course ignore the fact that the law has to make 
possible normative decisions but rather, that the knowledge basis of decision­




























































































b. The diminishing value of the distinction of the public and private 
spheres
Some years ago, Dieter Grimm, a judge at the German constitutional court and 
a law professor, in a lucid article on "The Future of the Constitution" drew 
attention to the fact that the rise of public responsibility for social developments 
and the phenomenon of a "materialization of the problem of justice" finds its 
repercussions in a tendential split between legal attribution of tasks and their 
rather fictitious fulfilment. This is related to the fact that the separation of State 
and society which had also to be presupposed by the pluralistic constitutional 
order is being superseded by the introduction of institutionalized hybrid 
collective mediating forms establishing themselves between the spheres of the 
public and the private. But there is a dynamic inherent in these processes 
tending to blur this distinction altogether.
Under the aspect of the cognitive rationality of law it is problematic if the 
selectivity of a supplementary remodeling of traditional individual legal 
attribution of responsibility (individual rights) is suffocated by a variety of legal 
forms of collective attributions of responsibility. This evolution may more and 
more shatter the inevitable differentiation between centre and periphery within a 
constitutional order, a differentiation, which is crucial for its operative power. 
For example: liberty and equality can't themselves be on an equal footing. The 
liberal constitutional system has used the distinction between the public and the 
private spheres in order to structure its self-description and in order to establish 
a search structure generating new knowledge and new options under conditions 
of bounded rationality.
Constitutional theory drawing on Habermasian discourse theory tends to 
ignore this basic assumption when it gives priority to a discourse on justice: It 
turns constitutional argumentation into a truth judgement which derives its 
legitimacy from the broadest participation in public discourse, and the reverse 
side of this assumption consists in giving the public sphere priority over the 
private - because in one way or another the latter is based on past decisions 
which may seem irrelevant or even illegitimate to us in the present. This 
structure is a consequence of certain preconditions of discourse theory which 
themselves are not candidates for discursive argumentation. You just have to 
accept them if you want to be admitted to the discourse. But of course, this is in 
itself a practical assumption which cannot be a truth condition itself.
On the other hand, the relationship between public and private is of 
course subject to historical transformation. However, new rules of coordination 
are necessary, once it is changed, either through legal norms or factual historical 




























































































systems, the bounded rationality of decision-making, and the collective action 
problems related to it is still valid or at least has to be taken seriously. There is 
no fixed point of observation or rational procedure of argumentation which 
could create self-transparency of constitutional discourses. This is the case 
because the liberal system has used limits and distinctions generated by 
historical evolution for reflexive constructional problems in a practical operative 
way.
c. Identity and difference in liberal systems
Liberalism has, in a certain way, set up a system which is able to manage a 
paradoxical constellation: i.e. to install a system of observation which 
invisibilizes its own preconditions, dependent on evolution, and at the same 
time allows for a continuous process of a-centric self-transformation by 
introducing an element of disorder, of chaos, into its self-observation by giving 
priority to differentiation instead of unity within the process of constructing 
order. This a-centric character of especially the distinction between public and 
private is mistaken if it is referred to a kind of "socio-ontological" assumption 
about the absoluteness of the pre-social individual.
The thesis that individual rights are supposed to be pre-political had had 
itself a paradoxical political-normative structuring character: historically it was 
opposed to certain traditional religious or social powers or ideologies drawing 
on different versions of social order institutionalized by a transcendent will. 
But, one should keep in mind that especially the tradition of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (and other early liberal authors, as well) never accepted the idea 
of an individual, irresponsible of the consequences of his or her action. 
However, responsibility was owed not to his or her alter ego but to the more 
abstract institutions replacing the ancient transcendent order given by God or 
his worldly representatives. This construction is not an expression of 
indifference to others, but rather a consequence of the insight that actions and 
their effects can no longer be interpreted in a "holistic" unitary way - as was the 
case in traditional societies integrated by shared religious beliefs. A more 
abstract legal order needs stop-rules whose simplification and differentiation of 
cause-effect relationships and responsibilities are set up with the hope of 
creating "a kind of justice" or, at least, allow for learning from unjust social 
constellations - inasmuch as operative criteria for observation are made 
available. This approach is based on the assumption that social cooperation is 
precarious, that its conditions are hard to describe and even harder to control, 
once society has accepted the indeterminacy of an evolutionary dynamic, 




























































































d. The example of property
Property especially has always been a problem for constitutional theory. 
Because of its obvious bias towards inequality, property can only be legitimized 
by the assumption that a reciprocity of balancing of interests cannot be obtained 
immediately, but that, on the other hand, social interaction is only possible if 
some fundamental basic problems for which there is no simple solution are not 
raised. In this respect the liberal system does in fact derive its dynamics from 
conflicts, but conflicts processed by making distinctions and separations. 
Finally, these conflicts are characterized by a paradoxical potential, that of 
breaking down a basic indeterminacy into a distributed a-centric diffuse process 
of decision-making which operates under conditions of undecidability created 
by the fragmentation of religious order. One of the main examples for this 
paradox is the shift of undecidable questions of the just distribution of property 
to the efficiency of the ongoing processing of a property system.
Any attempt to remodel post-modem constitutional systems has to take 
into account the basic structure of individual rights and adaptation to a context 
characterized by indeterminacy, and finally the insight into the internal limits of 
self-observation of society, as well as the necessity related to this basic 
structure of a continuous creation of mechanisms constructing, observing, and 
elaborating constraints and confronting society with these constraints and the 
consequences generated from its operations therewith.
The alternative to this approach very often consists in nothing but the 
réintroduction of a problem instead of a critical solution. For example: replacing 
private property as a way of managing the collective action problem by 
appealing to public control. Anyhow, it should have become clearer that the 
distinction on which liberal society is based and its effect of making some 
fundamental problems invisible is related to the necessity of generating some 




























































































3. The Evolution of the Constitutional Order of the Society 
of Organizations
a. The cognitive role of organizational pluralism
These ideas are mainly based on a description of the liberal society taken as a 
society of individuals. But these elliptical reflections may bring us to a new 
perspective on the process of transformations coming about within 
contemporary observation of potentials of society, and therewith, create a new 
dynamic within the legal and constitutional system, as well: in a first step the 
pluralistic - corporatist - remodeling of Liberalism had introduced more 
flexibility and a broader range of action potentials into the constitutional order. 
However, it presupposed possibilities of standardization and aggregation of 
compatible interests, within industrial relations by way of collective bargaining 
procedures or within politics by the introduction of political parties as 
organizations prestructuring alternatives for public decision-making. These 
"hybrid" organizations, the big representative organizations, have functioned as 
a kind of organized memory - supplementing the knowledge-generating 
potentials of the diffuse a-centric structure of the society of individuals drawing 
on experience as a knowledge basis spontaneously evolving through trial-and- 
error processes. The new problems are rather characterized by the phenomenon 
that the structuring power of the big representative macro-organization has 
weakened. The productive organization is flexibilized and gains more 
importance, therewith, the role of forms of coordination at the level of the firm 
grows. Mass production in the big enterprise loses its paradigmatic force which 
had also introduced important transformations within the legal system, forms of 
organizations of production within groups of firms become more heterogeneous. 
This development weakens the traditional organization of industrial relations. 
Within the political system the structuring potential of parties diminishes, the 
membership basis of the representative organizations in general narrows more 
and more and, therewith, is prone to strategies of endorsement of minority 
interests: especially the interests and views of civil servants as an organized 
group.
b. Complexity and the self-description of the State
This - very simplified - development is all the more important, the more the 
weight of administration and its competences is extended, a process which has a 




























































































example: every evaluation of non-traditional tasks of public authorities is 
always linked to the possibility of a loss of jobs. On the other hand, the growing 
number of administrative tasks reduces visibility and controllability by the 
citizen. There has never been much of a consensus on the role of the State, as 
many idealistic constitutional theories tend to convey. They rather appear to 
have formed a "package deal" which citizens more or less accept as a 
compromise the outcome of which is regarded as acceptable. But once more 
and more tasks are shifted to the administration which apparently serve interests 
of smaller groups, citizens react with a reluctance which in fact can lead into a 
self-destructive circle of trying to get "compensation" from one of the many 
sections of public assistance and subventions instead of openly opposing this 
development. This evolution tends to reduce the aforementioned cognitive 
structuring potential of the pluralistic constitutional system. Many analyses of 
the Welfare State agree on the fact that those who need help most are not those 
who profit from the Welfare State but rather groups of well-off clientilistic 
groups.
This evolution tends to reduce the aforementioned cognitive structuring 
potential of the pluralistic constitutional system and asks for a new step towards 
a more complex mechanism of knowledge generation. First of all we have to 
accept and take into account that there are more and more problems which are 
unstructured, almost indescribable, and which devaluate experience, rules of 
attribution of responsibility and the function of organizations as a kind of social 
"memory" for decision-making processes. On the legal, especially the 
constitutional side of the problem we become aware of a tendency towards a 
self-blocking of the constitutional system, especially its interrelationship 
between normative rules and cognitive infrastructure.
c. The rise of complex causality and the problem of the self-description 
of society
We have had to become familiar with "complex causality" in nature - putting 
into question the calculability of linear cause-effect relationships - but society 
has beome no less complex. For the new social problems there won't be any 
"end of the pipe"-technologies, either. I will only mention one example: the 
explanation of unemployment. The American economist Paul Krugman has 
recently quite plausibly observed that all present approaches provide only 
partial explanations of this intriguing phenomenon and that the most realistic 
assumption will have to accept that this is a case of complex causality, that 
means, a lot of different concurring and competing partial causes are to be 




























































































sciences - must consist in gaining access to an institutionalized approach to 
model this new type of complex causality. In legal terms this could mean e.g. 
that collective bargaining processes would have to be constrained to link their 
tariff policy to certain model-constructing assumptions about their expectations 
concerning central data of the economic process, a model which would have to 
be designed in a way to allow for comparison and retrospective observation. 
This would be a way of confronting society and social actors with self­
generated constraints.
d. Toward a remodeling of the liberal system - the "experimenting 
society"
A third step towards restructuring of the liberal system seems to be necessary: 
the link between such a possible new procedural third-order remodeling and its 
starting point, the equlibrium model of the society of the individuals, could 
consist in designing new institutions and procedures which are not focused on 
the model of public deliberation but instead are adapted to the a-centric search 
process guaranteed by the pattern of the loosely coupled private and public civil 
rights and the operative and constructive possibilities included therein. This 
would mean that a self-modeling and self-designing capacity, which in the past 
was based on trial-and-error processes within the society of the individuals, 
should be reconstructed and transferred to the differentiated social systems (not 
the individuals) with the prospect of an "experimenting society". This 
conception tries to link itself to the liberal principle that a constitution must 
always be based on a kind of pre-constituted order from which it derives the 
distinctions with which it organizes decision-making processes and attributes 
responsibilities. In the past we could more or less rely on some implicit 
regenerative power of society. But under the conditions of the new paradigm 
the process of generation of new possibilities, the intertwinement with 
unintended consequences, must be taken into account more explicitly. The pre­
constituted order of society is now characterized by the "society of the 
organizations", an evolution to which institutions of the pluralistic constitutional 
system have only partially been able to adapt. Whereas societies in former times 
could draw on a shared distributed body of common knowledge and the trial- 
and-error procedure it made possible, in the present the knowledge generated 
by organizations has to be accepted and to be presupposed as the predetermined 
brainwork of the constitution into which new inter-organizational search and 
observation processes adapted to conditions of growing uncertainty have to be 
introduced. The productive, generative character of the accelerated innovation 
of knowledge is inscribed into the strategic managing processes of 




























































































blocking or shifting unintended consequences to external groups or the State. 
This is an evolution which has only come about recently because the traditional 
representative organizations were more or less long-term oriented and had to 
find compromises among heterogeneous interests within their own 
organizational strategy, and this dualistic remodeling of the liberal society was 
still quite closely linked to its basic individualistic assumptions, remodeling 
equality through group parity and liberty through group autonomy. A new 
evolution crossing the limits of the pluralist order is much more heterogeneous 
and needs a new definition of its relationships to the roots of Liberalism.
4. Toward a Post-Modern Constitutional Theory
a. Critique of argumentative rationality
Contrary to the "argumentative rationality" of the post-conventional model of 
deliberation prompted by the Habermasian School, the model here advocated 
would rather presuppose bounded rationality and draw on the operation with 
provisional conventions, the management of self-produced constraints, 
functioning as stop-rules oriented at setting up "viable" distribution and 
attribution of decisions and their consequences. At present new distinctions are 
necessary which have to be adapted to self-organizational processes in society 
which are no longer registered by the old "representative" macro-organizations. 
A discourse-ethical version of proceduralization of constitutional law would 
rather neglect these specific functions of the legal system. The priority of a 
discourse of justice would expect too much collective action potential, it 
underestimates the inevitability of constraints for the ongoing process of 
differentiation of society which cannot be overcome by "deliberation".
A post-modern society cannot be integrated by common shared beliefs 
but rather by "overlapping networks" of practical differentiated political and 
social interactions generating a kind of implicit knowledge can be drawn 
functioning as the raw material for setting up explicit conventions. Civilized 
societies based on the possibility of pursuing self-interests, a strategy, from 
which much more learning capability and universalizability can be generated 
than by an abstract discourse of justice which is not adapted to the description 
of constraints imposed on networks of collective actions, and, at the same time, 




























































































innovation. This approach could introduce new life into the a-centric distributed 
order of rights and competences of the liberal system.
b. Liberal institutions and the prospects of a self-organizing society
A complex society confronted with uncertainty must turn into an "experimental 
society" restructuring its institutions in the sense of a reshaping of incentives for 
learning and adaptation. The fact that the main actors now are organizations and 
not individuals bars the way back to a pseudo-liberal "deregulated" society. But 
the liberal traditions exclude as well the alternative of a State replacing 
spontaneous self-regulatory potentials of the market by substantive goal- 
oriented regulations. That is why a renewal of a liberal society under conditions 
of complexity which must change into a self-organizing society can only be 
imagined to come about by a procedural strategy of "punctuation" of 
organizations with irritations introducing potentially externalized problems 
which can no longer be left to spontaneous evolution. The procedural character 
of this conception consists in the assumption that it is flexibility, the possibility 
of developing long-term perspectives, and that it is more requisite variety, 
which is at stake - not a State-defined social or ecological responsibility 
imposed on firms, to give an example. The possibility of self-observation of 
public and private organizations acting in fields with no clear evident criteria of 
control should be established within the intra- and inter-organizational networks 
of relationships. The general frame of reference should be focused on methods 
and procedures of confronting social systems and organizations with self­
generated constraints challenging the risk especially of organizations to be 
locked in some established drag of their development. The stress of this 
conception is laid on a paradoxical external determination of internal self- 
determination of organizational networks of interrelationships, leading towards 
a new legal order of a "self-organizing society" which is distinguished from the 
primary liberal society of the individuals by the characteristic that its self­
modification comprises also its own rules. And at the same time it would be 
different from the "society of organizations" inasmuch as it would have to be 
open to more accelerated processes of self-modification of society which can 




























































































c. Self-observation and self-evaluation of the State in a knowledge 
society
For the internal rationalization of the State the above-mentioned approach could 
mean e.g.: administrative tasks which are hard to structure should only be taken 
up if a systematic evaluation programme is set up generating information and 
alternatives which are no longer obvious but have to be generated themselves. 
Close suffocating links between political parties and administrations should be 
broken up by the introduction of new incompatibilities, institutions of a cultural 
and political sphere should also be constrained to introduce more innovative 
potential, once the traditional links between these institutions (broadcasting, 
etc.) can no longer draw on the orientation function of the big representative 
organizations (political parties, trade unions, churches, etc.), the educational 
system should be set under constraints to continuous self-observation and self- 
evaluation linked to processes of evaluation from outside. Public tasks in 
general should be more related to the development and conservation of the 
informational infrastructure of society (in a broad sense) which would have to 
be set up in a sense such as to generate more possibilities and widen the pool of 
variety of society. In this way procedural objective duties of the State could be 
linked to the rationality of traditional liberal rights rather than being integrated 
into the continuity of a substantive purpose-oriented logic of the Welfare State.
d. Outlook: a post-modern réanimation of liberal values?
After the first model of spontaneous generation of more possibilities within the 
"society of individuals" we had to adapt to a secondary modeling of the 
pluralistic "society of the organizations" and now we have to pass to a "self- 
organized society" preconceived as a third-order modeling of the liberal society. 
Of course this does not mean that this model replaces the two earlier ones but a 
new coordination between the three layers will be necessary. (The second-order 
model didn't replace the traditional model either.)
But a liberal constitution, and this is valid for a post-modem one, as well, 
in one way or another has to presuppose pre-constituted potentials for the 
development of self-stabilizing networks of interactions which of course 
especially ask for legal restructuring. Superimposing a substantive purpose- 
oriented system of government regulations would not be a model adapted to the 
new conditions of complexity and uncertainty. And a normative supposition of a 
new consensus brought about by inter-subjective argumentation oriented at an 




























































































course) could not take into account this basic structure inherent to 
indeterminacy.
The procedural approach as it is suggested in this paper would rather 
continue the traditional rule-based character of Liberalism adapting to a self­
organizing society. Rules are characterized by the fact that they introduce 
binding force and reliability into networks of social relationships which 
themselves generate a potential for self-stabilization. A mle-based rationality 
processes negative constraints (not a positive "steering" programme) enabling 
productive interactions, interrupting unproductive lock-ins contributing to a 
flexible search structure for the self-organizing society.
The prospect of a post-modem constitutional order should thus be more 
oriented at establishing new kinds of procedural rules stressing flexibility, 
innovation, experimentation, incentives for long-term horizons of decision­
making, confronting systems and organizations with self-generated constraints, 
developing self-observation potentials and evaluation capabilities within a 
strategy oriented at managing the unexpected through the generation of learning 
capabilities and not the introduction of more and more public purposes and 
shifting of tasks to public authorities.
To build a bridge to our starting point, one could say, there might be 
something to the assumption that the breakdown of Communism has also 
shifted the focus to some legitimation problems of Capitalism, but we must in 
fact dig a bit deeper in order to get a grip on some profound process of self­
confirmation of liberal society. The perspective here developed consists in 
going back to basics of Liberalism and checking whether the basics of a rights- 
based individualistic society can be remodeled and introduce new vitality into a 
post-modern society. And this hidden strength of Liberalism could be identified 
in its capacity to manage indeterminacy. The cognitive infrastructure of 
individual liberties and a structure of rights in constitutional theory has been 
used as a frame of reference to which present weaknesses of constitutional 
systems have been referred and which at the same time - in a normative 
perspective - has been used in order to remodel a procedural rationality of a 
constitutional system adapted to indeterminacy under conditions characterized 
by the transformations leading into a more complex, more rapidly self­





























































































1 This has provoked reflections on the end of history, cf. F. Fukuyama, The 
End of Liberty and the last Man, New York 1992.
2 Cf. only A.E.D. Howard (ed.), Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe, 
Washington D.C. 1993; R. Deppe/H. Dubiel/U. Roedel, Demokratischer 
Umbruch in Osteuropa, Frankfurt/M. 1991.
3. Cf. generally H. Dubiel, Zivilreligion in der Massendemokratie, Soziale 
Welt 1990, p. 125 ss.; id., Ungewi-heit und Politik, Frankfurt/M. 1994; 
U. Roedel (ed.), Autonume Gesellschaft und libertâre Demokratie, 
Frankfurt/M. 1990.
4 See Dubiel, ibid., (FN.3). More differentiated A.O. Hirschman, I conflitti 
come pilastri della società democratica, Stato e Mercato 1994, p. 133 ss.
5 Concerning tendencies of ossification created by big organizations cf. M. 
Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation 
and Social Rigidities, New Haven 1982; id., Logica delle istituzioni, 
Milano 1994.
6 For the concept of observation and its theoretical underpinnings cf. N. 
Luhmann, Beobachtungen der Moderne, Opladen 1992; G.F. Lanzara, 
Capacità negativa - Competenza progettuale e modelli di intervento nelle 
organizzazioni, Bologna 1993.
7 For the concept of complexity in modem research cf. F. Fogelman Soulié 
(ed.), Les théories de la complexité, Paris 1991.
8 Cf. L. Krüger et al., The Probabilistic Revolution, Cambridge/Mass., two 
volumes, 1987; id., Kausalitât und Freiheit, Neue Hefte fur Philosophie 
32/33 (1992), 1 SS.; G. Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance: How 
Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life, Cambridge 1989; W. 
Lübbe (ed.), Konsolitât und Zurechnung: über Verantwortung in 
komplexen kulturellen Prozessen, Berlin 1994.
9 For our theoretical presuppositions cf. G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic 
System, Oxford 1993; N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 





























































































10 Cf. H.A. Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in: S. Latsis 
(ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge 1976, p. 129 ss.; 
see also G. Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 
EUI Working Paper No. 14, 1982; K.H. Ladeur, Social Risks, Welfare 
Rights and the Paradigm of Proceduralization, EUI Working Paper Law 
No. 95/2.
11 Cf. D. Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung, in: U.K. Preuss (ed.), Zum 
Begriff der Verfassung, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p. 277 ss.
12 For details see Ladeur, ibid. (FN 10).
13 Cf. J.S. Coleman, The Role of Rights in a Theory of Social Action, JITE 
1993, p. 213, 223.
14 Cf. R. Alexy, Basic Rights and Democracy, in: J. Habermas's Procedural 
Paradigm of the Law, Ratio Juris 1994, p. 227 SS.; cf. generally J. 
Habermas, Faktizitât und Geltung, Frankfurt 1993; id., Reconciliation 
through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism, Journal of Philosophy 1995, p. 109 ss.
15 Cf. generally V. Vanberg, Rational Choice, Rule-Following and 
Institutions, in: U. Maeki/B. Gustafsson/C. Knudsen (eds.), Rationality, 
Institutions and Economic Methodology, London 1993, p. 171 ss.; id., 
Rules and Choice in Economics, London 1994.
16 For the theoretical importance of distinctions see Luhmann, ibid. (FN 6); 
id., The Differentiation of Society, New York 1982; id., Erkenntnis als 
Konstruktion, Bern 1988; see also N. Goodman/C.Z. Elgin, 
Preconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, London 1988.
17 Cf. also A. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, New York 1992.
18 Cf. generally S. Holmes, The Anatomy of Anti-Liberalism, Cambridge 
1993.
19 See generally J.G.B. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History, New York 
1985; J.F. Spitz, La face cachée de la philosophie politique moderne, 
Critique 1993, p. 307 ss.




























































































20 See especially D. Schmidtz, The limits of Government: An Essay on the 
Public Goods Argument, Boulder 1991, p. 16 ff.; see also C.R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism, Property, Democracy, Constitutional Political 
Economy 1991, p. 371 ss.
21 Cf. J.P. Dupuy, On the Supposed Closure of Normative Systems, in: G. 
Teubner (id.), Autopoietic Law: New Approaches to Law and Society, 
Berlin/New York 1987, p. 51 ss.
22 Cf. Luhmann, ibid. (FN 9), p. 470 ss.; id., Verfassung als evolutionare 
Errungenschaft, Rechtshistorisches Journal 1990, p. 176 ss.
22a Cf. Sunstein, ibid. (FN 20).
23 Cf. generally K.H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrecht der Wissensgesellschaft, 
Berlin 1995.
24 Cf. M.J. Piori/C.S. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide, New York 1984.
25 Cf. D. Sugarman/G. Teubner (eds.), Regulating Corporate Groups in 
Europe, Baden-Baden 1990; for present risks of a lock-in of the liberal 
property order see M. Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme, Paris 1991.
26 Cf. generally N. Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy, Chichester 
1989; id., TTie Irrational Organization, Chichester 1985; id./J.P. Olsen, 
The Reforming Organization, London 1993.
27 Cf. L. Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, Chicago 1990, p. 192; 
see also cf. G. Klosko, Rawls’s "Political" Philosophy and American 
Democracy, American Political Science Review 1993, p. 348 ss.; M. 
Warren, Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation, APSR 1992, p. 8 
ss.; S. Burrtt, The Politics of Virtue Today - Critique and a Prospect, 
APSR 1993, p. 360 ss.
28 Cf. A. Lindbeck, The Advanced Welfare State, Stockholm University, 
Institute for International Economic Studies, Seminar Papers No. 395, 
1987.
29 Cf. K.H. Ladeur, Coping with Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the 
Proceduralization of Environmental Law, in: G. Teubner/L. Farmer/D. 
Murphy (eds.), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The 





























































































30 Cf. P. Krugman, Inequality and the Political Economy of Eurosclerosis, 
CEPR, Discussion Papers No. 867, London 1993.
31 Cf. Ladeur, ibid. (FN 10).
32 For the theoretical background see N. Luhmann, Soziale Système, 
Frankfurt/M. 1984; for the legal system cf. id., Teubner, Ladeur, ibid. 
(FN 9); this often leads to the "humanistic" misunderstanding that a social 
theory presupposing communications as its basic components (and not 
human individuals) must lead to inhuman consequences; but a theoretical 
presupposition that a holistic approach is impossible because of 
overcomplexity cannot be refuted by the normativistic assumption that 
this is necessary. And of course a system of theoretical approach does not 
neglect individual and collective values.
33 Œ. Spitz, ibid. (FN 19).
34 Œ  Habermas, ibid. (FN 14); Alexy, ibid. (FN 14).
35 Cf. generally J.G.B. Probst, Selbstorganisation - Ordnungsprozesse in 
sozialen Systemen, Hamburg/Wien 1987.
35a Cf. P. Davidson, Achieving a Civilized Society, Challenge, September/ 
October 1989, p. 40, 46.
36 For an ethical theory taking into account the possibilities of action H. 
Kraemer, Integrative Ethik, Frankfurt/M. 1990.
37 On the legal system cf. Luhmann, ibid. (FN 9), p. 490.
38 Generally Teubner et al. (eds.), ibid. (FN 29).
39 Cf. generally M. Crozier, Etat modeste, Etat moderne, Paris 1991; see 
also N. Luhmann, Political Theory of the Welfare State, Berlin 1990.
40 Cf. for the necessity of evaluation J. Leca, Sur le rôle de la connaissance 
dans la modernisation, Revue Française d’Administration Publique 1991, 
p. 185,194.
41 For an economic perspective on rules see R.A. Heiner, Imperfect 
Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedents and Rules, 




























































































Behavior, American Economic Review 1983, p. 560 ss.; for a 
philosophical approach stressing the creative orientation function of rules 
opening new possibilities of actions cf. E.F. McClennen, Rationality, 
Constitution, and the Ethics of Rules, Constitutional Political Economy 
1993, p. 173 ss.; D. Gauthier, Impegno e scelta. Saggi sulla razionalità 
dei progetti, Ragion Pratica 1 (1993), p. 163 ss.; in legal perspective cf. 
M. Adams, Normen, Standards, Rechte, Juristenzeitung 1991, p. 942 ss.
42 A. Peyrefitte (Du “Miracle” en économie, Paris 1995) has recently shown 
convincingly how post-modem society can (and should!) learn from its 
past experiences (instead of escaping into wishful thinking prompted by 
existing and “alternative” bureaucracies promising to alleviate the burden 
of continuous adaptation to self-generated constraints): Successful 

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 




□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1996/97





































































































Working Papers in Law
LAW No. 90/1
David NELKEN





1992 -  What are our Rights? 
Agenda for a Human Rights 
Action Plan *
LAW No. 90/3 
Sophie PAPAEFTHYMIOU 




Legislativer Trilog im Institutio- 
nellen Dreieck der Europâischen 
Gemeinschaft. Das Verfahren der 
Zusammenarbeit nach Artikel 
149 Absatz 2 EWGV. *
LAW No. 90/5 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Représentation territoriale et 
représentation institutionnelle: 
réflexions sur la réforme du Sénat 
belge à la lumière des expériences 
étrangères




F. H. M. POSSEN
Primus Inter Pares: The European
Court and National Courts.
The Follow-up by National Courts 
of Preliminary Rulings
ex Art. 177 of the Treaty of 




Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann 
Progressive
LAW No. 90/8 
Bruno DE WITTE 
The Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes in the Context of 
Community Regional Policy *
LAW No. 90/9 
Anne-Laurence FAROUX 
Le Ministère de la Culture en 
France: Création et organisation
LAW No. 91/10
Christian JOERGES (ed.)
European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards 
Vol. 1
C hristian JOERGES




European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards 
Vol. 2
G ert B r u g g e m e ie r /
H ans-W . MlCKLITZ 
Product Safety Legislation 































































































European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards
Vol. 3
G ert BRUGGEMEIER/
J o se f FALKE/Christian JOERGES 
Product Safety Legislation in the 
Federal Republic o f Germany and 
in the United States *
LAW No. 91/13
Christian JOERGES (ed.)
European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonisation and Standards 
Vol. 4
J o se f FALKE/Christian JOERGES 
“Traditional" Harmonisation 
Policy, European Consumer Pro­




European Product Safety, Internal 
Market Policy and the New Approach to 








Markt ohne Staat? Die 
Wirtschaftsverfassung der Ge- 
meinschaft und die Renaissance 
der regulativen Poliuk *
LAW No. 91/16
Erk Volkmar HEYEN 
Systemic Interference and Social 
Segmentation of Scientific Legal 
Discourse: Some Theoretical 
Perspectives and Empirical 





der auswartigen Kulturpolitik *
LAW No. 91/18
Hans-W. MlCKLITZ 
Internal Legal Instruments for the 
Regulation and Control of the 
Production and Use of Chemicals 
and Pesticides *
LAW No. 91/19
Hans Ulrich Jessurun 
d’ OLIVEIRA
Class Actions in Relation to 
Cross-Border Pollution.
A Dutch Perspective *
LAW No. 91/20
Luis Marfa DIEZ-PICAZO/ 
Marie-Claire PONTHOREAU 
The Constitutional Protection of 




Aidan O’NEILL/Jason COPPEL 






























































































Massimo LA TORRE 
Linguaggio giuridico e realtà so­
ciale. Note sulla critica realistica 
del concetto di diritto soggettivo
LAW No. 92/23 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Integration v. Regulation?
Social Regulation in the European 
Community *
LAW No. 92/24
José Engràcia ANTUNES 
Le Groupe de Sociétés.
La crise du modèle légal classique 
de la Société Anonyme
LAW No. 92/25 
Christian JOERGES 
Geschichte als Nicht-Geschichte: 
Unterschiede und 
Ungleichzeitigkeiten zwischen 
Friedrich Kessler und der 
deutschen Rechtswissenschaft 
***
History as Non-History: 
Divergences and Time Lag 
between Friedrich Kessler and 
German Jurisprudence
LAW No. 92/26 
Michael KING/Catherine KRATZ 
La Notion d’intérêt de l’Enfant en 
Droit: Vecteur de Coopération ou 
d’interférence?
LAW 92/27
Massimo LA TORRE 
A National-Socialist Jurist on 
Crime and Punishment - Karl 
Larenz and the So-Called 
‘Deutsche Rechtserneuerung’
LAW No 92/28
Diarmuid ROSSA PHELAN 
The Application of United States 
and European Community 
Domestic Trade Laws to the 
Imports of Nonmarket Economy 




Das Hochststimmrecht als 
Instrument zur Wahrung des 
Aktionarseinflusses
LAW No. 92/30
Massimo LA TORRE 
Diritto, potere, dominio 






In collaboration with Michelle
EVERSON
Europe After 1992
New Regulatory Strategies *
LAW No. 92/32
Renaud DEHOUSSE
Does Subsidiarity Really Matter?*
LAW No. 92/33 
Diarmuid ROSSA PHELAN 
“It’s God we Ought to Crucify”
*
LAW No. 93/1
Massimo LA TORRE 
Réglas, instituciones, transforma- 
ciones. Consideraciones sobre el 































































































European Community Law and 
International Economic Relations: 
The Saga of Thai Manioc
LAW No 93/3 
Aidan O’NEILL 
The Government of Judges 
The Impact of the European 
Court of Justice on the 








Soft Law and Institutional Practice
in the European Community
LAW No. 93/6 
Jason COPPEL 
Individual Enforcement of 
Community Law: The Future of 
the Francovich Remedy
LAW No. 93/7
Massimo LA TORRE 
Nostalgia for the Homogeneous 
Community: Karl Larenz and the 
National Socialist Theory of 
Contract
LAW No. 93/8 
Heike GEHRKE 
The Implementation of the EC 
Milk Quota Regulations in British, 




Abortion: Challenges to the Status 
Quo
LAW No. 94/2 
Sally SHELDON




Comparing National and EC Law: 
The Problem of the Level of 
Analysis
LAW No. 94/4
A Regulatory Framework for 
Foodstuffs in the Internal Market. 
Report on the Conference (6-7 
May 1993) organised by Francis 
SNYDER
LAW No. 94/5 
Christian JOERGES 
Rationalization Processes in 
Contract Law and the Law of 
Product Safety: Observations on 
the Impact of European 
Integration on Private Law 
***
Rationalisierungsprozesse im 
Vertragsrecht und im Recht der 
Produktsicherheit: Beobachtungen 
zu den Folgen der Europaischen 
Integration fur das Privatrecht
LAW No. 94/6
Francis SNYDER 
Integrità e frontiere del diritto 
europeo: riflessioni sulla base 































































































Risikoregulierung: Ein Problem 




On Women and Legal Forms
LAW No. 94/9 
Martine SPENSKY 
Mary Wollstonecraft, William 
Thompson: deux voix/voies vers 
l’égalité, 1792-1825
LAW No. 94/10
Luis Maria DIEZ-PICAZO 




‘Out on the Weekend’: Reflections
on European Union Law in
Context
LAW No. 94/12 
Jonathan GOLUB 
Rethinking the Role of National 
Courts in European Integration:
A Political Study of British 
Judicial Discretion
*  -:i:- *
LAW No. 95/1
Christian JOERGES 
Das Recht im ProzeB der 
europaischen Integration 
- Ein Plâdoyer fiir die Beachtung 
des Redits durch die 
Politikwissenschaft
LAW No. 95/2 
Karl-Heinz LADEUR 
Social Risks, Welfare Rights and 
the Paradigm of Proceduralisation 
- The combining of the institu­
tions of the liberal constitutional 
state and the social state
LAW No. 95/3 
Francis SNYDER 
The Taxonomy of Law in EC 
Agricultural Policy: A Case Study 




Forms and Constitutional 
Limitations
LAW No. 95/5 
Massimo LA TORRE 
Democracy and Tensions - 
Representation, Majority 
Principle, Fundamental Rights
LAW No. 95/6 
Karl-Heinz LADEUR 
Post-Modern Constitutional 
Theory - A Prospect for the Self- 
Organizing Society
♦out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
.
!
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
